What is intriguing is that there was another recent media report. Foreign media broke the news that Tesla’s former and current employees revealed to the U.S. Consumer News and Business Channel (CNBC) that Tesla will produce power batteries and energy storage equipment for electric vehicles in order to get rid of as much dependence on suppliers as possible. dependence and gradually transform into a vertically integrated model.

　　On the one hand, it issued a statement to carry out a "cloud recall", and on the other hand, it independently developed batteries. What kind of considerations are hidden behind these two seemingly unrelated actions of Tesla, and what impact will it have on the effective solution to the spontaneous combustion problem?

　　If there had not been a series of spontaneous combustions, Tesla's independent research and development of power batteries would probably only be interpreted as a "break with Panasonic." This is also a normal move for new car companies to strive to get rid of the constraints of strong suppliers.

　　In the past few years, the feud between Tesla and Panasonic has been full of ups and downs. In the early days of cooperation, Panasonic was even willing to invest in Tesla's battery factory; as the model 3's diversified battery supplier strategy progressed, the rift between Panasonic and Tesla grew wider. Just in April this year, Panasonic and Tesla both froze their production capacity expansion plans for the "Super One" battery factory, and the outside world speculated that the two were about to "break up."

　　The "departure and merger" between Tesla and Panasonic is just the norm between strong power battery suppliers and new car manufacturers. In the domestic market, many new car manufacturers have not yet formed a scale and can only purchase power batteries at high prices. Some insiders say that "the so-called supporting services are almost non-existent."

　　The successive spontaneous combustions have begun to expose the "supply crisis" between Tesla and Panasonic, or in other words, between new car manufacturers and powerful power battery suppliers - a simple buying and selling relationship hides huge safety risks.

　　In Tesla's statement, "no system defects were found" and "single battery module failure" became the main rhetoric. In the end, it only provided an OTA upgrade solution called "cloud recall". Through this statement, the public saw that Tesla was not responsible for the fire, and Tesla did not clearly indicate the specific cause of the "single battery module failure."

　　Coincidentally, NIO's recall announcement also pointed the problem at the battery module, saying that the spontaneous combustion was due to "the voltage sampling wire harness in the NEV-P50 module being improperly oriented individually", which caused wear due to extrusion of the cover plate. , the possibility of short circuit. This was followed by an announcement from CATL, stating that the spontaneous combustion was due to interference between the battery pack box and the module structure it supplied.

　　It is unclear who is right and who is wrong, or who is more responsible, but the cooperation model between new car manufacturers and suppliers must change.

　　The cases of Tesla and Panasonic, as well as NIO and CATL, have shown that simple supply implies highly uncertain security issues. As a new thing, the supply chain system of pure electric vehicles has not been verified over many years like that of traditional vehicles, and there is no experience in the cooperation and running-in between suppliers and manufacturers.

　　As one of the core of the three electric power batteries, manufacturers and suppliers should or must have in-depth cooperation and collaboration under unified standards from beginning to end. At present, in the domestic market, only the early cooperation between BMW Brilliance and CATL is like this. The cooperation between the two parties has full interaction from design, production to verification, and the standards are also set by BMW Brilliance.

　　As we all know, in addition to module cells, power batteries also include circuit temperature detection signals, cell voltage detection signals, bus contactors, safety switches, busbars, connectors, box structures, battery energy management systems, etc., one more link The division of labor creates one more safety hazard. Either cooperate deeply or solve it yourself.

　　Tesla's decision to independently develop batteries is obviously its intention to abandon the optimization of the cooperation model and independently lead the R&D and production of core components. It is not yet known whether this company has the corresponding strength. In any case, safety issues have begun to force Tesla and NIO to reorganize their car-making processes, which should be taken as a warning for new car-making companies.

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